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PREDICTION MARKETS: PRACTICAL
EXPERIMENTS IN SMALL MARKETS AND
BEHAVIOURS OBSERVED
Jed D. Christiansen
This paper discusses a series of prediction markets created and operated in the summer of 2006 to
measure calibration and behaviour of small-scale prediction markets. The research finds that small
markets are very well calibrated and determines a potential minimum threshold of participation to
ensure well-calibrated results. The results also established the markets as very efficient at predicting
small probabilities.
Behavioural aspects of markets are also examined. Trader behavioural types are assessed and
categorised; while a small group of traders were extremely active, over half of all traders rarely traded.
Market manipulation is examined and found to be occasionally effective, though only in very small
markets. Finally, incentives to trade are discussed; these markets were effective with no incentives for
trading at all.
1. INTRODUCTION
Few “real-world” experiments have been conducted to test the efficiency
and calibration of prediction markets; the majority of articles cite predictions
from the Hollywood Stock Exchange, the Iowa Electronic Markets, and
TradeSports’ sports and events markets.1 All of these markets have high
volumes of trades and aim to predict popular current events. The national or
international scope means that the general public participating in these
prediction markets usually does not face any knowledge barriers; on average,
a person knows enough about these topics to trade in predictions of elections
or the success of popular films.
The aim of this research was to create prediction markets in a field with no
established “experts” and with little popular attraction. Such a market would
resemble potential business problems, where there is a significant knowledge
barrier and unexperienced traders are the norm. Rowing was chosen to be the
topic for these prediction markets as it is a popular sport in the United
Kingdom, but one that has essentially no press of events outside of the
national team news. It is also a sport where knowledge is generally known
only to participants and localised by geography, and one where there is no
method or forum for aggregation of opinions.
First, calibration of the markets is examined in whole. Subsets of that data
are then further examined to asses how the number of traders involved in a
market affects its calibration. Behaviours exhibited by traders are also
examined and categorised, as are incentives to participation since a market
needs sufficient participation to succeed. As a market needs sufficient
participation to success, the issues around providing incentives to traders are
examined. Finally, these results are synthesised into recommendations for
future use of prediction markets in the business sector. This paper
demonstrates that small-scale prediction markets, where knowledge barriers
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and privacy considerations dramatically limit the pool of participants, can
effectively generate reliable information from which any organisation can
make better decisions.
2. PREDICTION MARKETS IN APPLICATION
In 1988, the University of Iowa developed simple markets to trade unique
assets: contracts that paid out according to the winners of political elections.
A trader could purchase a contract through their system (later web-based)
which would pay the holder $1 if George H.W. Bush won the 1988 election,
and $0 otherwise. This concept showed that markets need not be tied to
trading solely physical or financial assets; they can trade futures contracts of
any type. These futures contracts, through the market mechanism, evaluated
the probability of an event occurring through a price function. If a Bush
contract was trading at $0.60, the market evaluated the chance of a Bush re-
election at 60%. The principle that the prices can be interpreted as
probabilities has been established in theory, with varying approaches on
rationality and attitudes toward risk.2
Early Iowa Electronic Market results demonstrated that futures contracts
for uncertain, non-financial events could be accurate. Even though the profit
motive was not as strong (trading was limited to relatively low amounts of
money due to U.S. securities regulations), the market was still efficient, and
the pricing of contracts, and consequently the probability of a particular event
occurring, was accurate.
ASSET STRUCTURE
The market maker needs to decide what information he or she wants from
the market so that the asset can be properly designed to elicit that information.
Once this decision has been made, the operator can use one of two primary
methods of structuring assets. The first is a “winner-take-all” model, where
two or more contracts are listed in a market. Of these contracts, one and only
one will occur and will thus be cashed-out (typically at either $1 or $100). The
market price is then the probability that a particular contract will occur.
Another type of asset is created for use in an index market. That asset
cashes out based on the exact state of a particular value at a particular time.
For example, an asset can be created that will pay its owner $1 for every
percentage point of popular vote won by a presidential candidate. This is the
type of futures market found on standard exchanges; examples include the
percentage market share achieved or the cost of a barrel of oil to be delivered
in 90 days. While other asset structures are certainly possible, a winner-take-
all and index contract are the most common in prediction markets.
Elections futures commonly use both types of markets. The first
establishes the probability that a candidate will win the election, whilst the
second predicts the share of the vote that the candidate will receive.
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MARKET STRUCTURE
Within a broad framework of a market, there are a variety of structures
that define its operation. The most conventional is the continuous double
auction (CDA). In this structure, buyers place “bid” orders at a specific
volume and price, while sellers place “ask” orders at a specific volume and
price. When the prices match, or the ask price is lower than the bid price, a
trade occurs. This continues until all possible orders have been fulfilled and a
spread exists again between the bid and ask prices. In some markets, a market
maker is used to ensure sufficient liquidity, at a risk of a loss to the market
maker. In a CDA, information is continuously updated as traders use news and
events to better inform their decisions and make a profit by acting quickly.
However, if too few traders exist in a market, the spread between the bid and
ask prices can be too large, and thus little or no trading takes place.
An alternate structure is that of a pari-mutuel market. Originally created
for sports betting, a pari-mutuel market pools all of the money placed on
“bets” for individual contracts, and awards it to the eventual winner, making it
appropriate only for winner-take-all markets. The probability of a contract
occurring is thus the ratio of the amount bet on an individual contract to the
pool of bets in total. Pari-mutuel markets have infinite liquidity, so traders can
be guaranteed in this type of market their order will be taken and there is
absolutely no risk to the market maker. However, there is no method in which
a trader can sell back his or her bet at a profit (assuming the bet was on a
contract whose probability of occurring rose). Because of this, there is no
advantage for an individual who has already bet to act on new information.
Traders should rationally wait until all possible information is known
(theoretically just prior to market close) and trade at that time, which means
that prices of contracts won’t necessarily reflect full information until shortly
before market close.
More structures have been developed that try to combine the best aspects
of both CDA and pari-mutuel markets. David Pennock of Yahoo Research
Labs has created the Dynamic Pari-Mutuel (DPM) market, which aims to be a
true hybrid of a CDA and a pari-mutuel market.3 Robin Hanson has created
markets that use Market Scoring Rules (MSR) to adjust prices.4 While
originally developed for use in combinatorial markets to find probabilities of
independent variables, an MSR market can also be used for a single variable,
such as the probability of an event occurring. Each market structure has
benefits that will be attractive to different market operators.
MARKET USES
Prediction markets is one of many terms used to describe using market
structures for informative and predictive purposes. The term “prediction
markets” reflects their common use: forecasting future events. However, other
terms reflect other potential uses: information markets or decision markets
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reflect that the prices determined by these markets are used to inform decision-
makers and decisions. They can be used in any forum where uncertainty can
be properly structured; a film’s box office success, an election, or who will win
the next series of Big Brother. More importantly for corporations, they can
inform business decisions on projected sales of product lines, predict which
pharmaceuticals would likely be approved by government regulators, and find
efficient solutions to corporate-wide resource allocation problems. To date,
prediction markets have been used in resource allocation at BP and in project
management for Siemens Germany.5 As organisations recognise the potential
of high-quality information about uncertainty, prediction markets will become
more widely adopted.
3. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
3.1 The problem: predicting race winners
Rowing is a popular amateur sport in England, as well as the greater
United Kingdom, as evidenced by the history of the sport in the country.
England is home to both Henley Royal Regatta, the oldest running regatta in
the world, and the University Boat Race, an annual race between Oxford and
Cambridge Universities that was first held in 1829. According to the Amateur
Rowing Association, over 20,000 people actively compete each year, who
belong to over 550 rowing clubs across England and Wales.6
Determining the winners of rowing races is an intriguing problem, as most
competitors train in near isolation for over six months from October to April.
During the autumn and winter seasons there are only two major long-distance
endurance (head) races to gauge a crews’ progress relative to the broad
spectrum of other club crews. The summer season consists of shorter,
Olympic-style sprint races and there are very few regattas that are large, and
prestigious, enough to attract top talent from across the country. Most clubs
compete in smaller regattas consisting of clubs from their region only. There
is no press coverage in the sport on the club-level, nor are there are “experts”
or neutral arbitrators that can accurately judge how crews are able to perform
against each other before the crews meet in competition.
Particularly at top regattas, where there is a large pool of quality entries,
predicting race winners is a difficult task. Injuries, illness, and general crew
swapping mean that the squad within a boat frequently changes. Some crews
enter multiple events, meaning their performance could be substantially worse
for events held later in the day. Many crews have never competed against each
other and traders have results from only the head races, a much different style
of racing, to use for comparison.
Many of these same issues exist for the national teams competing in
World Cup events. Each trains alone for months, emerging only to race in the
World Cup regattas, primarily as practice and proving grounds for the World
Championships or Olympics each year. Whilst there is more press on the
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well-funded national squad crews after a major event, there is little to no
information available regarding progress of a crew prior to an event.
Since the problems of crew changes have greater impact and are more
frequent at lower levels of the sport, this experiment uses only prediction
markets for top-level crews. This was also beneficial from a marketing
perspective, as more people would know or recognise the rowers competing at
a higher level. More importantly, crew performance at the senior levels of the
sport is more consistent. This does not mean it is easier to predict race winners
at this level, as the quality of entries is quite high and margin between first and
other placings quite small. Stable crews ensure that variations in success or
race times are due to the performance of the crew itself, and not from undue
influence of other factors.
3.2 Software solution used
This work was undertaken in partnership with Inkling Markets in
Chicago, Illinois who ran the website and software for the prediction markets
for this research. The primary criteria in choosing a software provider was the
user interface; it had to be as easy as possible for novice traders to use, while
also providing instant liquidity. These factors were deemed necessary to
ensure that new traders would be able to participate immediately after logging
into the system. While other software programs provided more sophisticated
trading mechanisms, these are best used when users have a strong interest in
participation or can receive sufficient training. Inkling’s user interface was
designed with the most novice participants in mind.
Inkling has three potential algorithms available to market creators: a
winner-take-all market, an index market, and a multiple winners market. (The
multiple winners market allows for multiple winners in one market, such as
the top three out of ten sales categories.) For this experiment the winner-take-
all market was selected, which uses a trading algorithm that kept the combined
total of all contracts in a market at $100 (100%). As one stock was purchased,
its price was subsequently adjusted upward. The software would then adjust
all other stocks downward to maintain the total in the market at $100.
A unique feature of Inkling’s software is the language and method it uses
for new traders to express their judgement. When a particular contract is
selected, the trader has three choices. Each choice uses the current price, for
example $15 on a $100 scale, and answers the question the market seeks to
answer, such as “Will John McCain win the 2008 Republican Presidential
Nomination?” The answers are framed: “Chances are higher than 15%,”
“Chances are exactly 15%,” and “Chances are lower than 15%.” If a trader
selects the “exactly 15%” option, they are informed that they should not trade,
and wait until the price changes. The “higher than 15%” and “lower than
15%” choices directs the software to either purchase shares or sell them short,
respectively.
The next step of the process is selecting how much to invest in a contract.
Instead of purchasing a specific number of contracts at a particular price, as in
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a CDA market, each share purchased moves the market price incrementally.
Traders are shown four elements: a written expression of their confidence
(probability is “Way too low,” “Low,” or “Way too high,” “High,” etc.), a
number of shares to trade, the amount necessary to make a trade, and an
estimated market price after the trade. Depending on the participants’
understanding of the market they could trade on any of the three pieces of
information.
This step can be very useful as it can work with any mental model of
trading that a novice trader holds, and informs them of all the consequences of
their actions. (If they trade based on a written description, they are informed
how much capital it requires and how high the price will rise or fall as a
consequence.) The only potential problem with this implementation is that the
software makes an arbitrary link between a written description and its impact
on pricing. While there is no real link between the two, it does provide a guide
to novice traders that should enable them to accurately express their
judgement.
3.3 Trading algorithms
In practice, this trading algorithm is neither a CDA nor a pari-mutuel
market. It most closely resembles the Dynamic Pari-mutuel model as
theorised by David Pennock, though during this experiment the price function
in Inkling’s software did not vary with traded volume.7 Inkling’s software has
since been updated to use Robin Hanson’s Market Scoring Rule, though
currently only in one variable.8 At the time of the experiment, for each share
that a trader purchased of a particular contract, the traded price increased by
$0.10 no matter the current volume, which means that just one trader can have
a significant effect on prices in a given market. This concept and its effects are
elaborated further in the section on market manipulation.
The algorithm used allows each individual market to serve as an
independent set of trader judgements. While each market’s judgements are
independent from each other, the set of trader judgements (within each
market) are not independent. The algorithm automatically adjusts the prices of
the non-traded contracts so that each set’s contracts sum to $100.
The following is an example of a market consisting of four contracts using
this simple algorithm. Initially the price of each contract is identical, $25:
A - $25
B - $25
C - $25
D - $25
The first trader decides to purchase shares of contract A, raising the price
to $40. The algorithm recalculates the prices for the other three contracts:
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A - $40
B - $20
C - $20
D - $20
A second trader then decides to sell shares of contract D short to a value of
$5. The prices account for the transaction:
A - $45
B - $25
C - $25
D - $5
A third trader sees the price of contract B, believes it to be undervalued
and purchases shares. The algorithm adjusts the prices:
A - $43
B - $31
C - $23
D - $3
This process continues until the market closes. In a thinly traded market,
one trader could make a massive purchase that could not be easily countered
by others. Conversely, a thickly traded market could see prices swing wildly
as significantly biased traders move prices for their favoured contracts in a
“ping-pong” effect. These examples are discussed further in a later section.
4. CALIBRATION OF TRADER JUDGEMENT
4.1 Overall calibration
Prediction markets were run for five major regattas: Marlow Amateur
Regatta, HenleyWomen’s Regatta, Henley Royal Regatta, PoznanWorld Cup
Regatta, and Lucerne World Cup Regatta. The first three regattas involve
competitors from throughout the United Kingdom, while the last two are
major international events.
A total of 39 individual markets were created, with one being discarded
from calibration results due to incomplete data. A total of 399 competitors
(contracts) were entered in the 38 markets. Over the course of the project, 183
traders actively participated in the markets.9 Figure 1 shows the distribution of
popularity of the markets, as measured by how many traders participated.
Because of the high number of contracts in each market, there is a
significant concentration of predictions at very low probabilities. With an
average of 10.5 contracts per market, a typical contract would begin trading at
just above 9.5%. Only three markets were binary options, or between two
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competitors. Many “favourites” in the various markets reached probabilities
between 20 to 80%, forcing less popular contracts to probabilities in the 1 to
10% range. Table 1 shows the distribution of contracts in each final traded
price band:
A standard calibration of this data, as shown in Figure 2 with identical-
width intervals of ten percentage points, shows a relatively poor calibration
curve.
This poor calibration is due to the few number of data points in most
intervals; over 75% of contracts are in the 0–10% band. This causes the
standard regression method to mis-represent the calibration of traders.
The regression is dramatically skewed from perfect calibration by one
market: the Stewards’ Challenge Cup at Henley Royal Regatta. In this two-
boat event, the Great Britain boat was heavily favoured as it had not lost a race
TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF CONTRACTS ACROSS PRICE BANDS
Price Band # Contracts # Winners
75 to 100 2 1
65 to 75 8 6
55 to 65 3 1
45 to 55 6 2
35 to 45 8 7
25 to 35 18 5
15 to 25 30 8
5 to 15 81 4
0 to 5 243 4
Total 399 38
FIGURE 1. Number of markets for each band of traders.
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in over two years. Consequently, trading in that market pushed its price to just
over $95. However, on the morning of the event illness struck the crew and it
pulled out of the race, losing the event. The calibration curve is affected
particularly because this race serves as the one and only data point with a
trader judgement of over $80, and thus it radically affects the linear
regression. Therefore, the standard calibration model taken without that event
is examined, deleting data for the $95 contract that lost and the $5 contract that
won. This calibration is shown in Figure 3 below:
FIGURE 2. Standard calibration of all markets.
FIGURE 3. Standard calibration of all markets (except Stewards’ Challenge Cup).
PREDICTION MARKETS
25
Copyright © 2007 The University of Buckingham Press
All rights reserved
The regression for this data demonstrates nearly perfect calibration. The
dramatic swings in the graph are due to having only a small number of data
points available to evaluate at higher prices, resulting in a low R2 value of
0.6427. Without the Stewards’ Challenge Cup data points (representing only
0.5% of the total number of contracts) calibration measured in the standard
manner is remarkable.
However, a different method can be used to obtain a better representation
of the calibration of the market with data points given equal weight. The data
was separated into ten intervals with an equal number of contracts in each
band. Where a group of identical final prices would be divided into two bands,
the number of contracts in each band was adjusted slightly. While this yields
irregular intervals, it does ensure enough contracts are in each interval for a
proper assessment of calibration. This data set includes the Stewards’
Challenge Cup. Using this method, overall calibration of the traders was even
more impressive, as shown in Figure 4.
The regression is very nearly perfectly calibrated, particularly at lower
probabilities. Having a sufficient number of contracts in each interval causes
the R2 value to increase to 0.9631, an excellent fit. The exact data used is
shown in Table 2.
As discussed in the software description, though 399 individual
evaluations contributed to this experiment, the data consists of only 38
independent sets of prices. Since the software forces the sum of prices in a
market to sum to $100, individual prices cannot be truly independent, though
each set of prices is independent of each other.
FIGURE 4. Calibration of all markets.
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4.2 Calibration compared to market size
To date, little research has been done into the practicality of small-size
prediction markets. Charles Plott and Kay-Yut Chen conducted prediction
markets at Hewlett-Packard to predict quarterly sales of various products,
monthly sales of products, and profit sharing estimates.10 They published
results based on 12 markets, with between 7 and 26 participants. While they
found that their markets were better predictors of future sales than HP official
forecasts, there was no assessment of how size affects calibration of the
market. Large prediction markets such as NewsFutures, Hollywood Stock
Exchange, and Iowa Electronic Markets have proved their efficiency in
numerous studies, but few small prediction markets have been assessed.
The number of data points used in these experiments is too small to draw
definitive conclusions, but broad trends can be assessed. As shown in Figure 1,
there were a number of markets with fairly low participation and a small
number of traders, similar to experiments conducted by Plott and Chen. The
markets were split into four bands to examine the practical effects of a small
number of traders in a market. The number of traders, contracts, and divisions
(data points) for each band are shown in Table 3. Figures 5–8 show the
calibration of the markets for each range of traders.
TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF PRICES AS USED IN CALIBRATION CALCULATIONS
Price Band Average Market Price # Contracts # Winners % Correct
30.58 to 95.22 49.11 39 20 51.3
13.13 to 28.98 20.02 40 10 25.0
8.42 to 12.92 10.2 40 2 5.0
4.78 to 8.25 6.74 40 3 7.5
3.68 to 4.66 4.26 39 0 0.0
1.91 to 3.64 2.48 38 1 2.6
1.75 to 1.89 1.84 40 0 0.0
0.52 to 1.74 1.16 40 0 0.0
0.28 to 0.51 0.38 36 0 0.0
(-)0.45 to 0.27 0.13 44 2 4.5
Total 399 38
TABLE 3
NUMBER OF TRADERS AND CONTRACTS IN EACH DATA Set
Band # of Markets # of Contracts # of divisions
0–10 Traders 9 89 8
11–15 Traders 7 83 8
16–20 Traders 10 115 10
20þ Traders 12 112 10
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Figures 5–7 show a positive correlation between the quality of the
calibration and the number of traders in a market.
In the 0–10 trader band of markets, there is a significant level of under-
confidence shown, with contracts at higher prices performing significantly
better than what is predicted by the final prices in a market. This improves
with additional traders, as seen in Figure 6 with 11–15 traders, though the
phenomenon is still present. Figure 7 shows that the under-confidence
phenomenon is eliminated and shifts slightly toward over-confidence at higher
probabilities when 16–20 traders are participating in the market. Finally,
Figure 8 shows that in markets with 21 or more traders, there is an element of
FIGURE 5. Calibration of markets with 0–10 traders.
FIGURE 6. Calibration of markets with 11–15 traders.
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over-confidence for contracts at the highest prices, though the fit is poor with
an R2 value of 0.7766.
Economics theory holds that more traders and more activity in a market
causes it to become more efficient. In this experiment, markets with more than
twenty traders were somewhat less efficient than those with twenty or fewer
traders. Again, this data is somewhat skewed because of the inclusion of the
Henley Royal Regatta Stewards’ Challenge Cup event. Because of the small
data set, only 12 independent sets of judgements, this data point is removed
because of its inordinate effect on the results. Calibration of the markets
FIGURE 7. Calibration of markets with 16–20 traders.
FIGURE 8. Calibration of markets with 21 or more traders.
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(without the Stewards’ Challenge Cup Event) with more than 20 traders is
shown in Figure 9 and the difference is clear.
The data without the Stewards’ Challenge Cup is more consistent with
other markets with higher numbers of traders, such as Figure 7.
The under-confidence phenomenon emerges in markets with a small
number of traders, as seen in Figures 5 and 6, due to a combination of the
effects of the specific software algorithm used and the general concept of
liquidity. An extreme example is the case of the Men’s Quadruple Scull (M4x)
event at the Poznan World Cup regatta. In this market, only five people chose
to trade, and each trader placed one purchase order each. In a standard CDA
market, that level of interest would be insufficient to move market prices.
Using the algorithm within Inkling’s software, there is infinite liquidity so
prices did move, though the low level of interest meant prices moved only
slightly; not sufficiently enough to truly reflect the consensus judgement of
traders. The starting and final prices are shown in Table 4.
The same trend is seen in markets with more traders. For example, the
Wyfold Challenge Cup at the Henley Royal Regatta had 12 traders
participating. Though there were 32 entries in the event, only 5 contracts saw
any trading activity. Of the five contracts traded, four were seeded teams in the
event, and the fifth contract consisted of only one trade. The entry with
the highest value was Thames Rowing Club ‘A’ at $42.86, a low figure
considering significant wins by the same Thames crew in the previous month
at the Metropolitan Regatta and Marlow Regatta, as well as significant interest
from the participating traders. Whilst additional traders and interest in this
market caused a finer distribution of prices among the favourite crews, there
was insufficient interest to create a wider differentiation amongst the less-
favourite crews.
FIGURE 9. Calibration of markets with 21 or more traders (exclusive of Stewards’ Challenge Cup).
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In sum, markets with 16 or more traders are shown to be well-calibrated.
Markets with 15 or fewer traders are calibrated, but show increasing levels of
under-confidence toward the market favourites as fewer traders participate.
With a small number of traders, prices simply could not be driven far enough
to represent the traders’ consensus.
4.3 Calibration of small probabilities
Historically, traders have difficulty properly assessing small probabilities.
Studies of transactions in thousands of horse races show that bettors
consistently overestimate the probability of unlikely events.11 As described
elsewhere, if small probabilities are biased, they are consistently over-
estimates instead of underestimates, particularly in smaller markets.12
JustinWolfers and Eric Zitzewitz write that an open question in prediction
markets is: “Are markets well calibrated on small probabilities?”13 The
aggregate data in these markets show that these markets are, in fact, well-
calibrated on small probabilities. The prediction markets created for this
experiment benefited from a massive number of contracts judged by traders
to have a small probability of occurring. There were 243 contracts priced
between $0 and $5 (0–5%) at the end of trading. Of these contracts, 4 won
their events, for an actual outcome of 1.646%. Whilst the midpoint of the
0–5% interval is 2.5%, the distribution of the contracts within the band is
quite uneven; the average contract price in the band is 1.7295%. This is
remarkably close to the predicted 1.646%.
5. INCENTIVES IN THE MARKETS
5.1 Participation in rowing markets
The most distinct incentive to attract traders to a prediction market is
monetary gain, as can be had through exchanges such as TradeSports, BetFair,
Iowa Electronic Markets or similar websites that cost money to trade and
TABLE 4
CHANGE IN PRICES IN POZNAN WORLD CUP MEN’S QUADRUPLE SCULLS EVENT
Crew Name Initial Price Final Price
Australia $10.00 $7.75
Belarus $10.00 $7.76
China $10.00 $7.75
Czech Republic $10.00 $15.18
Denmark $10.00 $7.75
France $10.00 $7.75
Ireland $10.00 $7.78
Poland $10.00 $18.16
Ukraine 1 $10.00 $12.32
Ukraine 2 $10.00 $7.80
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reward traders with real money. Play money exchanges typically use a
different kind of reward to encourage participation. This may be t-shirts,
company-branded gifts, gift certificates, or similar rewards.
Real-money exchanges are generally believed to be the most accurate, as
there can be a significant utility to trading correctly and dis-utility to trading
incorrectly. However, recent research has shown that predictions in identical
markets on real-money and play-money exchanges are highly correlated with
each other, and both are highly accurate.14 The incentives for trading well in
the play-money markets appeared to be a sense of status and some potential
prizes.
In the prediction markets operated for this project, there were no
incentives provided to traders; no gifts were ever mentioned or promised, no
rewards (other than being listed in the top ten) for top traders, or any other
prize.15 In addition to no incentives, the only publicity for these markets was
one short post on a rowing news/information/gossip website called The
Tideway Slug that is heavily trafficked in the United Kingdom. That post
turned viral, with readers informing friends and crew-mates that the website
would not have originally reached, with 40% of participants surveyed finding
out about the markets from another site, e-mail list, or friend. Though it was
only posted to one rowing website, the reach and readership of that website
was sufficient to garner a good diversity of traders.
This demonstrates that there may be sufficient incentives to encourage
participation without requiring any subsidisation by a market operator. Based
on a survey completed at the end of the experiment, there are a few key
reasons why this occurred.
COMMUNITY AND UNIQUENESS
Several traders mentioned that they heard about the markets from their
friends, and the element of community encouraged participation. Rowing is a
relatively small community and many traders in the post-market survey
indicated that they liked having something that catered to their interests. When
asked about the best aspects of the markets, one participant stated they
appreciated “being able to ‘bet’ on rowing which normally receives no
attention,” and another remarked “the whole things [sic] was rowing related,
it was great.”
PERSONAL STAKE
Most traders were eager to participate as they had first-hand knowledge of
a crew’s performance. In many cases participants were trading on boats in
which they were racing.16 Nearly all traders were and are active participants in
the sport and thus are familiar with clubs, boats, and crews from their region.17
Thus, even if a trader wasn’t making predictions on the performance of their
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own boat, they were making predictions on boats and crews with which they
were familiar.
COMPETITION
Particularly since the traders were competitive athletes, the spirit of
competition spilled over into the prediction markets as traders attempted to
win in another environment. One participant wrote that the best aspect of the
markets were “taking something I knew a little about and trying to apply my
knowledge in a competitive way.” Other traders saw the markets as a “chance
to compete with others” and “fun, and competitive.”
5.2 Modelling participation for future events
Lessons from this experiment can potentially inform future construction
of incentives in company markets. Whilst the pure passion of a small,
competitive sport can inspire participation in a unique forum without any
incentives for participation, this is unlikely to be the case in the average
business environment.
Unique, interesting events do not require incentives. Yahoo has held
periodic brainstorming sessions for new products or services. These ideas,
generated by employees, were previously judged by executives to determine
the most commercially viable option. Instead of relegating the judging to a
small committee of individuals with a similar background and place in the
organisation, Yahoo created prediction markets to inform the decision.18 This
is an ideal example of a “unique, interesting event,” as the markets could be a
fun and popular method for employees to examine each other’s ideas and
predict which could be successful. Provided there is a low barrier to
participation, employees would likely need no incentive to participate.
Certain events where traders feel a very personal stake may also be
appropriate for markets without incentives. A potential example of this could
be a move or addition to company offices. Markets could indicate which
locations employees prefer, while gauging the depth of feeling toward a
potential move. The fact that the employee could be personally affected would
likely be incentive enough to participate.
6. TRADING BEHAVIOURS
On the individual user level a number of common behaviours emerged
from the markets. Over one-third of participants are classified as One-Stake
traders, individuals who made one trade in each market in which they
participated.19 Most of these individuals participated in fewer than 7 different
markets, though three people traded in as many as eleven markets. They tested
the markets, made a small number of purchases, never short sells, and did not
make any additional trades based on price movements. Their purchases were
essentially votes for the race winner.
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Another type of trader is a slightly more complicated version of the One-
Stake traders; these are classified as Initial Set traders. The rowing prediction
markets yielded 21 traders of this type. These individuals made trades on
multiple contracts in a market, and would both purchase shares of some stocks
and sell others. However, this type of trader does not sell back (or repurchase
in the case of shorts) shares they already hold, so once they express their belief
they make no effort to reverse their position. Their purchases and short sells
established an initial set of beliefs that did not vary.
The opposite of the One-Stake and Initial Set traders are the Heavy
Traders, as they participated in 10 or more markets and made multiple trades
per market. There were 12 of these traders; five were in the top ten by net
worth at the end of the experiment, with four of the traders in the top five.
Seven of these individuals made over 100 individual trades.
The remaining 74 participants can be classified together as Busy Traders,
despite the low volume of trades for some individuals. These traders would be
willing to sell positions that had risen to ensure a profit, instead of risking the
traded boat losing in the event. Occasionally they sold contracts whose value
had fallen, presumably for the purpose of limiting potential losses.
In total, 97 of the 183 traders were individuals that applied their beliefs in
a single direction; the One-Stake and Initial Set behavioural types. Whether by
a lack of interest or lack of knowledge, they purchased a position in each
market and didn’t revert from it at all. Most of these chose either to purchase
or sell only one contract in a market. While just over half of the traders in these
markets chose a position and stuck with it, the remainder were responsible for
moving prices and causing the variations that existed in the marketplace.
7. MARKET MANIPULATION
Since these markets did not involve real money, there were few barriers to
manipulation by traders. In these markets, manipulation was not stopped, but
instead let it run its course to determine how the markets were affected. An
experimental goal was to assess if price manipulation in a practical prediction
market would work, as laboratory-based experiments and some field
experiments have shown that market manipulations do not affect price
accuracy.20
Motivations for market manipulation are varied. In information markets
or decision markets, the market may be manipulated to influence the eventual
decision being informed. However, the markets in this experiment were
designed as prediction markets, where the outcome is based on the quality of
forecasts that traders made. Motivations for market manipulation in this case
would likely be to make a favoured stock/boat appear much more likely to win
for psychological reasons. Since this was a play-money market, another
manipulation tactic was observed; participants would register multiple
usernames and make trades that would pump money from one username to
another.
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The first tactic appeared to be unsuccessful in markets with many traders,
though it was successful in markets with few traders. For example, in the
Men’s Quadruple Scull event at Henley Royal Regatta (with only 7 traders),
the very first trade pushed one entry to a price of $68.75 from it’s starting
point of $6.25. With only twelve other trades made in the market, there was
insufficient liquidity to move that very high starting price. Prices over time are
shown in Figure 10. The choice of the particular entry was unusual, as it was
not one of the seeded entries at the Regatta.21 Examining other purchases
by the trader showed that the individual bought shares of crews from the
University of London, indicating a motive of either enthusiasm or
manipulation.
Any attempts at price manipulation in larger markets were unsuccessful.
Nearly every large purchase was then countered, by either the same individual
or a competing trader, at some later point by selling back the original
purchase. Since the market algorithm used a linear scale to determine the
change in price after any purchase, the system is prone to instability in highly
contested markets and thus a specific manipulated price is difficult to
maintain. Still, the volatility of this algorithm ensures that any manipulation is
easily countered. In the market for the Men’s Senior 1 Eights event at Marlow
Regatta, 89 traders made trades. For the last day of trading, data was obtained
showing the price of every contract over time, and is shown in Figure 11.
Figure 11 shows two distinct manipulations of the market. The first is in
favour of Vesta Rowing Club, whose price was driven from near zero to $75
before being traded back to zero. From there it went up to $38 before returning
to zero. This series of manipulations and counter-manipulations took place in
the span of less than one hours’ time. Another major manipulation is shown
with traders pushing the price of London RC, the eventual winner, to nearly
zero, then purchasing shares to raise the price to $85 before falling to its
FIGURE 10. Prices over time in Men’s Quadruple Sculls. Top line is Univ. of London-A.
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equilibrium (pre-manipulation) range of approximately $20. This particular
series of trades took place in less than twenty minutes.
As discussed previously, unlike the model presented by David Pennock
where the price changes for each additional share purchased, the Inkling
algorithm was much more basic in it’s pricing model.22 In the markets used for
this experiment, each share purchased moved that contract’s price by $0.10,
no matter the current holdings of the current traders. In smaller markets this
model works well as it offers infinite liquidity, but in larger markets will scale
poorly as each individual has the ability to single-handedly move prices
well outside the market equilibrium. Unfortunately, as Figures 10 and 11
demonstrate, manipulation is much harder to counter in a small market
compared to a large market.
The second tactic, registering multiple usernames, was far more common.
In a survey completed by 81 of the 183 active traders, four people admitted to
registering as multiple users in order to manipulate the markets. Examining
registration e-mail addresses, it is estimated that an additional 4–6 traders,
some of those that did not answer the survey, used multiple logins to
manipulate the markets.
Pumping money from one user account to another was a relatively
straightforward process to manipulate the potential capital available to a trader.
They would purchase a block of shares in a particular stock then use a different
account to purchase additional shares of the same stock, driving the price up even
further. The trader would then sell the shares purchased originally at a net profit.
Whilst this leaves the second account at a disadvantage, it does improve a trader’s
standings in his or her original account.
FIGURE 11. – Prices over time for Men’s Senior 1 Eights at Marlow Regatta, final day of trading.
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Other traders simply favoured a particular boat in the competition; one
trader registered two additional accounts to make more trades in a given
market, the Women’s Double Scull (W2x) event at the Poznan World Cup. As
the chosen stock, New Zealand, was trading at approximately $50 per share,
the trader could purchase only approximately 100 shares with each account.
By purchasing shares with two different accounts the individual made a
significant move in the trading price of that particular stock, though the trader
chose not to “lock-in” a profit by selling shares from an original account, nor
did the trader use the profits from the eventual wins to make trades in later
markets. In that particular case it was a one-time manipulation, and likely a
consequence of patriotic fervour.
8. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Prediction markets have been growing in popularity, and have been
recognised as a potential decision support tool for businesses and
organisations. Through a market structure a company can tap the knowledge
and experience of all its employees, regardless of geography, function, or rank
within the organisation. Implementing prediction markets within a business
for strategic and tactical advantages poses significantly different issues than
implementing public prediction markets. The size, scope, and knowledge
barriers are very different between a public market and one designed as a
strategic decision support tool. The rowing experiments were designed to be
reflective of potential real-world prediction markets while examining current
topics in prediction market research. A number of principles have been
discussed that will prove relevant in future market implementation.
These markets proved to be accurate at aggregating and expressing the
opinions of the individual traders involved. The calibration curve of
the aggregate data demonstrates prediction markets can accurately assess the
probability that a given boat would win an event; in other words, the markets
effectively valued the assets involved. While this has been consistently shown
to be so in large-scale prediction markets (those with hundreds to thousands of
participants) this experiment shows it is also the case in small-scale markets,
those with a significantly limited pool of potential traders.
More importantly, the prediction markets analysed in this experiment
show that even markets with a very small number of people maintain their
ability to accurately assess probabilities. However, the results become
somewhat less accurate when there are 15 or fewer traders in a market, and are
even less reliable when 10 or fewer traders participate. In the case of this
experiment, the price algorithm used in the trading software was a significant
factor in producing biased data. When few people participated, the price
simply was not able to move far enough to reflect their true judgments. This
may be improved by introducing a new pricing algorithm, but is partly a
consequence of having a market structure that enables instant liquidity. Future
research will be able to measure the difference between the pricing algorithm
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at the time of the experiment (a linear function based on number of shares
purchased) and the Market Scoring Rules, which were adopted as the pricing
algorithm shortly after these markets concluded.
Future prediction markets could ensure higher quality predictions by
attracting sufficient numbers of traders. Based on the results presented here,
16 or more traders should be sufficient to obtain quality predictions. Smaller
markets may be just as useful, though they may exhibit biases of
underconfidence toward market favourites.
Due to the large number of individual contracts in each of these markets, a
large number of contracts were assessed with small probabilities. In these
experiments the answer to the question, “Are markets well-calibrated on small
probabilities?” is conclusively “Yes.”23 However, the rowing prediction
markets used n-way claims instead of binary claims. It may simply be easier to
assess probabilities in an n-way market.
Insufficient work has been done to examine trader behaviour in prediction
markets. This experiment addressed three behavioural topics: incentives for
participation, behavioural types, and market manipulation. Understanding
these behavioural issues will hopefully shed some light on how even small
prediction markets can work so effectively.
Trading in prediction markets is often encouraged by some type of
incentive. It is generally understood that for small-scale markets, a certain
subsidisation is necessary to ensure sufficient participation. Wolfers and
Zitzewitz propose three methods to ensure participation, specifically
uninformed traders: offering sports betting, subsidizing the markets, and
exploiting career concerns.24 Whilst this experiment did involve “betting” on
sports, no real money was involved, unlike websites like TradeSports or
BetFair. Without monetary gain, traders participated purely due to interest and
passion in a particular arena. The passion incentive is just as relevant as the
sports betting, subsidisation, and exploiting career concerns. While this type
of incentive would likely not succeed in markets that predict more mundane
topics, such as quarterly sales of product lines, it could be used for special
interest events that would then enable traders to become familiar with the
concepts and tactics of trading. An interesting market in which traders are
passionate about an outcome should not require any incentives at all.
Data analysis in these markets extended to the individual trader level and
an attempt was made to model traders’ behaviour. The intriguing result of
classifying behaviours is that over half of all traders were One-Stake or Initial-
Set traders. Traders essentially voted for or against the contracts they thought
would win or lose, and didn’t make any other trades. A large number of other
traders, the Busy Traders at 40% of the trader population, did buy and sell
contracts in response to price moves in the various markets. Since the markets
were well-calibrated, it demonstrates that even though a large percentage of
the trading population did not participate regularly in the form of multiple
trades, their behaviour set an initial landscape of pricing in the markets. This
landscape was then defined further by the Busy and Heavy Traders.
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With the high volume of trades from a competitive population of traders,
the markets were sometimes manipulated. The most common method was
using multiple user accounts to effectively transfer money from one username
to another. The only consequence of this on the markets was a somewhat
unfair advantage in capital available to trade. The less common market
manipulation was to make large trades to drive prices to extremely high or
extremely low levels. This tactic simply did not work in markets with a large
number of traders as other individuals rapidly moved prices back to their
original levels. The tactic did work in markets with few traders, as there
simply were not enough traders to overcome the manipulation.
Overcoming the two manipulation tactics should be relatively
straightforward. In a business setting it is easy to ensure that an employee
only has one user account, so he or she will be unable to gain additional capital
unfairly. Ensuring the market has a sufficient number of traders will eliminate
major price fixing through the second form of manipulation. By ensuring that
a market has enough traders to be well-calibrated (16 or more) the market will
likely have enough participation to counter any manipulation.
Prediction markets, as likely to be used in business environments, will be
on a smaller scale than those typically studied due to the significantly smaller
pool of potential participants available. The research presented here
demonstrates that the principles of prediction markets hold true down to the
size that could and would be used in business. Organisations can be assured
that using prediction markets, the individual and specialised knowledge of
each employee will be included in a company-wide assessment of uncertainty.
Whether that uncertainty is forecasting next quarters’ sales, the likelihood that
project deadlines will be met, or the best location for a new manufacturing
plant, a crowd of employees should efficiently assess the uncertainty involved.
NOTES
1. Hollywood Stock Exchange: Pennock, D, Lawrence, S, Giles, C. & Nielsen, F. (2001), Spann, M &
Skiera, B. (2003).
Iowa Electronic Markets: Wolfers, J., & Zitzewitz, E. (2004), Berg, J., & Reitz, T. (2003), Berg, J.,
Forsythe, R., Nelson, F., & Rietz, T. (2001).
Tradesports: Servan-Schreiber, E., Wolfers, J., Pennock, D., & Galebach, B. (2004).
2. Manski, C. (2004), Gjerstad, S. (2005), Wolfers, J., & Zitzewitz, E. (2005), Adams, C. (2006).
3. Pennock, D. (2004)
4. Hanson, R. (2003)
5. BP Climate Change Manager Jeff Morgheim (2000), Ortner, G. (1998).
6. E-mail from Tim Page, Amateur Rowing Association Membership Development Manager. (2006
August 8).
7. Pennock, D. (2004)
8. Hanson, R. (2003)
9. A total of 298 individual logins were registered by traders.
10. Chen, K, & Plott, C. (2002).
11. Snowberg, E., & Wolfers, J. (2005).
12. Wolfers, J., & Zitzewitz, E. (2004).
13. Wolfers, J., & Zitzewitz, E. (2006).
14. Servan-Schreiber, E., Wolfers, J., Pennock, D., & Galebach, B. (2004).
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15. A prize was promised after all markets were completed to encourage participation in the post-market
survey. The prize was rewarded in a random drawing of survey participants.
16. Over 40% of those surveyed.
17. of 81 participants surveyed.
18. King, R. (2006 August 3).
19. 76 of 183 traders.
20. Hanson, R, Oprea, R, & Porter, D. (2005), Hanson, R, & Oprea, R. (2004), Rhode, P. & Strumpf, K.
(2005).
21. At the 2006 Henley Royal Regatta, no event with seeded entries was won by an unseeded entry.
22. Pennock, D. (2004).
23. Wolfers, J., & Zitzewitz, E. (2006).
24. ibid.
REFERENCES
C Adams Learning in Prediction Markets (2006) FTC.
J Berg and T Reitz ‘Prediction markets as decision support systems’ Information Systems Frontiers (2003)
5(1) 79–93.
J Berg, R Forsythe, F Nelson and T Rietz ‘Results from a dozen years of election futures market research’ in
Charles Plott and Vernon Smith (eds) Handbook of Experimental Economic Results (Amsterdam,
Elsevier, forthcoming, 2001).
BP Climate Change Manager Jeff Morgheim ‘Statement to the Senate committee on commerce, science,
and transportation, full committee hearing on solutions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions’ (2000)
http://www.gcrio.org/OnLnDoc/pdf/pdf/morgheim000921.pdf. (accessed 1 June 2006).
K Chen and C Plott ‘Information aggregation mechanisms: concept, design and implementation for a sales
forecasting problem’ (2002) California Institute of Technology Social Science Working Paper 1131,
March.
S Gjerstad ‘Risk aversion, beliefs, and prediction market equilibrium’ (2005) Economic Science
Laboratory, University of Arizona.
R Hahn and P Tetlock (eds) Information Markets: A new way of making decisions (Washington, DC, AEI
Press, 2006).
R Hanson ‘Combinatorial information market design’ Information Systems Frontiers (2003) 5(1)
107–119.
R Hanson and R Oprea ‘Manipulators increase information market accuracy’. Department of Economics,
George Mason University (2004).
R Hanson, R Oprea and D Porter ‘Information aggregation and manipulation in an experimental market’
(2005) Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University.
F Hayek ‘The use of knowledge in society’ American Economic Review (1945) 35 519–530.
R King Workers, Place Your Bets, BusinessWeek Online (2006 August 3).
Manski, C ‘Interpreting the predictions of prediction markets’ (2004) NBER Working Paper No. 10359,
March.
Ortner, G ‘Forecasting markets- an industrial application’ (1998) Mimeo, Technical University of Vienna.
D Pennock ‘A dynamic pari-mutuel market for hedging, wagering, and information aggregation’ (2004)
Yahoo! Research Labs.
D Pennock, S Lawrence, C Giles and F Nielsen ‘The power of play: efficiency and forecast accuracy in web
market games’ (2001) NEC Research Institute Technical Report 2000-168.
P Rhode and K Strumpf ‘Manipulating political stock markets: a field experiment and a century of
observational data’ (2005) UNC Chapel Hill.
E Servan-Schreiber, J Wolfers, D Pennock and B Galebach ‘Prediction markets: does money matter?’
Electronic Markets (2004) 14(3).
E Snowberg and J Wolfers ‘Explaining the favorite-longshot bias: is it risk-love, or misperceptions?’ (2005)
Working Paper.
M Spann and B Skiera ‘Internet-based virtual stock markets for business forecasting’Management Science
(2003) 49(10) 1310–1326.
J Surowiecki The Wisdom of Crowds (New York, Anchor Books, 2004).
J Surowiecki Commercial Conversations, Forbes (2005, October 24)
THE JOURNAL OF PREDICTION MARKETS2007, 1 1
40
Copyright © 2007 The University of Buckingham Press
All rights reserved
J Wolfers and E Zitzewitz ‘Five open questions about prediction markets’ in R. W Hahn and P Tetlock
(eds) Information Markets: A New Way of Making Decisions (Washington, DC, AEI Press, 2006)
pp 13–36.
J Wolfers and E Zitzewitz ‘Interpreting prediction market prices as probabilities’. Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania (2005).
J Wolfers and E Zitzewitz ‘Prediction Markets’ Journal of Economic Perspectives (2004) 18(2) 107–126.
PREDICTION MARKETS
41
